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The European Response to the Marshall Plan 
The Marshall Plan is the commonly used nfiln:e for the European Reconstruction 
Program or the ERP. Following the conclusion of World War II it was the decision of the 
American State Department that rebuilding a strong and· able Western Europe was 
important to both the economic, as well as political goals of post World War Two 
�erica. On June 5th, 1 94 7 Secretary of State George C. Marshall delivered the 
commencement address to the graduates of Harvard University in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. In the address he outlined the State Department's vision for the economic 
rebuilding of Europe. In his speech he called for a united European response, one in 
which European nations assumed the leadership role, but which included the United 
States for financial support. In delivering this speech there were many questions that 
arose such as: Why is the European response critical? Did the British dominate the 
immediate European response? and What did the European response bring to Europe 
through the plan? Each of these questions posed as a response to Marshall's plan by 
historians deserved answers and over the next ten years following the Marshall Plan's 
implementation the people of the world would get the answers they were looking for. 
Why was the European response to the Marshall Plan critical? 
The Marshall Pla_n was a significant event in modem European history. In a literal 
sense it was the United States providing the funding for th� economic rebuilding of 
Europe. It brought Europe 13  billion dollars in four years, which equated to about .5 
percent of the GNP of the United States.1 If one were to adjust this amount for inflation 
and expansion of markets that amount would be equivalent to approximately 200 billion 
1 Schain, Martin A. The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After. P. 120 
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dollars in today's economy.2 The amount of money by itself does not answer the 
question, why was the European response to the Marshall Plan critical? For the answer to 
this question we must move into the historical context of post World War Two Europe. 
Europe, like much of the world had little direction on June 5th, 1 947. The 
European Tesponse to the Marshall Plan logically would involve how the continent 
developed economically, but also the direction it would take politically. This aid package 
would have to find its place in the numerous topics of the period including: the Soviet 
Union's role in the world, European and Trans-Atlantic multilateralism, the German 
position, and the expansion of Leftist governments in Western Europe. The Marshall Plan 
would help answer many of the questions in postwar Europe. Taking the situation to its 
logical end, the Marshall Plan would necessitate a position by taking on several of these 
postwar issues. 
George Marshall's speech itself was designed in a way so that a European 
response would answer a number of the important questions of the day. The Americans 
hoped it would help swing the pendulum of decision in their favor. Marshall called for 
Europe to devise an aid package they would find acceptable. It is important to note that 
the way Marshall proposed the solution was also important. First, it put the obligation on 
the Europeans to drive the, development of their aid. Their goals and values would be of 
principle importance. This, hoped the State Department, would help promote active 
participation by the European nations involved and create a more meaningful outcome in 
Europe. If the aid package was proposed from the nations in which it would benefit, it 
also would help limit the view that the Americans were hoping to buy the situation that 
most benefited them. The second important provision to the Marshall Plan was that it was 
2 IBID 
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an'offer to any and all European nations. In doing this it allowed the plan to keep some 
distance rhetorically from the recent development of the Truman Doctrine. The role of 
the Soviet Union would cettalnly be one of the major questions regarding the broad terms 
used in the speech regardless. 
Economically Europe was in dire need of aid in 1 94 7. The past winter had been 
cold and severe, one of the worst on record. The summer had not been much better, 
helping bring the level of agricultural output to sixty percent of the pre�ar level. 3 
Another issue was debts accumulated from wartime borrowing. The British owed 3 
billion in 1947 with another 1.25 billion due by 1950.4 The war had left numerous 
Europeans struggling and poor. Many Europeans 
.
had loses due to the destru�tion of war, 
the occupation by enemy armies, changes in production during wartime, loss of labor, 
destruction of supplies in other nations and the degradation of transportation capabilities. 5 
As a result of these factors, production was well below the level of the year immediately 
preceding World War Two. Therefore, production was the immediate goal of the 
Marshall Plan. 
While trying to increase production, the Americans hoped that by eliminating 
specific bottlenecks of the European economy a multiplier effect would be produced and 
Europe would soon be self-sufficient. As many economists would say, level of 
production is a key to the standard of living for any group of people: Therefore, if more is 
produced, then there will be more for someone in that population to consume. Prior to the 
war against Nazi Germany, Europe was already in dire economic times because of the 
3 Block, Fred. Origins of International Economic Disorder, pg. 76 
4 Newton, C.C.S. The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan. The Economic 
History Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, pg. 392. 
5 Committee of European Economic Cooperation, Volume I, pg. 5. 
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Great Depression in the United States and with postwar Europe only producing sixty 
percent of what they had been able to during a depression, it was not getting any easier on 
the people. In order to maintain a minimum level of .existence after World Was Two, 
Europe was importing goods that they needed, mostly from the United States. Since 
Europe was not producing nearly as much as they needed, the level of imports was 
growing and the cost of these imports was equally large. 
A problt'.m faced the European nations and that was a shortage of American 
dollars. This was commonly referred to as the "dollar drain" because of Europe's large 
net imports from America. Europe traditionally had a net deficit of trade with North 
America. In the past they had financed that deficit with a surplus in trade with other 
nations, mostly in Asia. World War II had also disrupted the type of triangular (between. 
nations in Asia, the US, and European countries) trade that Europe had previously 
survived on. 6 Although aid was generously given to Japan after WWII, the Marshal plan 
was aimed specifically at Europe. This was.important to note because there was no place 
outside the United States for the Europeans to earn dollars immediately after the war. If 
American aid had been given in Asia, the Europeans could have kept their triangular 
trade pattern that had been in place pre-World War II. 
Eric Roll, a British Diplomat of the time period, who eventually would be the 
head of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) Agricultural 
Committee, added these thoughts on the European response following the end of the war. 
He includes the large roll the dollar played at this time: 
There were of course subsidiary themes. But among the 
principal economic Themes, in my mind, was undoubtedly the 
question of the dollar shortage and Dollar viability, which was 
6 CEEC general Report, Vol. l, p. 6 
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far and away. the most important them.e in the British mind at 
the time. It affected, of course, all of the participating 
Countries but it was so.central to British economic policy 
thinking that its mark on the way in which the response of the 
European· countries to Marshall's speech was organized and the 
report drafted. 7 
In another point of view Hugh Dalton who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which is 
responsible for all economic and financial matters stated his point of view in his 
published Cabinet Papers. In February 1 946 Dalton's Cabinet papers show the emphasis 
on the topic of economics, he discusses in his words about the economy when 
mentioning, "we are rapidly going down the drain".8 This negative outlook may be less of 
an exaggeration than one initially thinks. The British had already secured a sizeable loan 
from the Americans to keep them afloat temporarily, before the Marshall Plan could be 
finalized. This British loan is significant for several reasons. In relation to "Dollar Drain", 
it highlights just how severe the problem was. The loan provided $3. 75 billion dollars on 
July 1 5th 1 946. Within one year of the first distribution of U.S. money, two billion dollars 
had been used. Dalton again may have been right when he commented on March 2 1st 
1 947, "We are racing through our US dollar credit at a reckless, ever accelerating 
speed".9 By the fall of 1 947 when interim aid was given before the Marshall Plan could 
pass through congress, Britain took its last 400 million dollars from the loan. The British 
had gone through the $3 . 7 5 billion in less than a year and a half. Also, its important to 
note that one of the terms of the loan was that the British pound would become 
convertible with other currencies.10 This meant that other countries could pass on their 
"dollar drain" to the British by converting pounds then held into dollars, which was the 
7 S Hoffmann & C S Maier, The Marshall Plan: a retr ospective p. 39. 
8 IB/Dp. 38. 
9 /B/Dp.38 
10 Newton, C.C.S, p. 400 
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best·currency on the planet at the.time. This term helped exaggerate the Britain's "dollar 
drain". This term also led to what came to be known as the Sterling Crisis of 1 94 7 and 
would be an important issue regarding British policy during the Marshall Plan Era. 11 The 
large losses that the British incurred during this time period immediately after the war 
helped establish them as an opponent of convertibility, which was one of the important 
factors of a need for a multilateral economic solution. 
The loan that was given to Britain in 1 94 7 provided much needed capital to the 
country. In receiving the loan, Britain achieved a level of economic stability at a time 
when they had little, even if this stability was only temporary. More importantly it made 
or kept the British dependent on American money while securing an Anglo-American 
economic relationship.12 This would promote decisive action on British Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin's part when the.Marshall Plan was proposed.13 Another effect of the aid 
given to Britain was the ability for the British to remain active in international affairs. 
Without additional funding there would have necessarily been cuts to either domestic 
welfare or in regards to spending on maintaining the role of Britain in the world. 
There was much question as to the political direction in Europe in the immediate 
postwar. The emergence of Socialist and Commullist parties in mainstream politics was 
of the utmost significance. Communism was in the midst of its high point seemingly 
expanding in every direction of the globe, The victory of the Soviet Union over the 
repressive fascist Germans and their ruthless leader Adolph Hitler brought the 
communists legitimacy, even if it was only for a short time. The left was gaining power 
11 IBID p. 400 
12 Block, Fred. The Origins oflntemational Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International 
Monetary Policy from World War H to the Present. P 86. 
13 IBID. p 87. 
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throughout Europe immediately after the end of WWII. The poor economic conditions 
facilitated growth of the left wing parties. The left-wing Labour party had been victorious 
in Great Britain in 1 945. Communism was also at the forefront in Italy and the 
Communists were the most unified political party in France. 14 In France 1 80 
democratically elected Communists controlled seats of the French congress. 15 The 
French Communists placed extreme political pressure on Prime Minister Bidault, forcing 
him to be at least sympathetic to Communist views. In addition, the mines in the British 
occupation zone of Germany were organized under socialist ideas. The way the Marshall 
Plan would affect and be affected by these politics was of critical importance. 
With the implementation of the Marshall Plan it meant that the United States had 
economic·ties to all the included nations. Included in these ties brought a tie to capitalism 
and at least a level of American planning. The response to Marshall's speech would mean 
big strides in how this relationship would work. The reason the response to the Marshall 
Plan was critical in this situation is that it provided insight into whether the American aid 
package would help solidify moderate politics or whether left wing factions would find 
the type of American intervention unacceptable despite the economic promises that go 
along With its acceptance. Yet another possibility would have been the use of the 
Marshall Plan aid to augment the goals of more radical reforms of government in the 
included nations. 
The issue of American involvement and the multilateral form that the Americans 
proposed raised the question of national sovereignty. Never before had Europe met in a 
multilateral way aimed at the economic good of the continent. The included nations faced 
14 Block. The Origins oflntemational Economic Disaster. p. 77 
15 IB!Dp.18 
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a difficult situation in this respect. For the Marshall Plan to be effective it meant member 
nations relinquishing power on some issues, possibly in a way detrimental to their 
national interest, all for the good.of Europe. The Soviet response is one we will examine 
later, but the answer Soviet Politician Vyacheslav Molotov gave British Foreign 
Secretary Bevin and French Prime Minister Bidault as to the possibility of inclusion is a 
reasonable one for the Soviets, and to a lesser degree other nations. Molotov said that the 
USSR was- interested in inclusion but only if they could act independently within the 
framework of the Marshall Plan.16 On the third day of British-French-Soviet negotiations 
regarding the European response Molotov began the day's discussion with the simple 
words, "no infringement on the sovereignty of European states."17 While his motives 
were debatable it sheds appropriate light on the topic of national sovereignty within the 
Marshall Plan. Other nations faced this same situation. If they responded in the proposed 
manner they would be. in effect tying their future to that of all the other European nations 
included in the Marshall Plan. 
European acceptance of the plan meant that they valued American money more 
than the losses they would incur from a level of American intervention. With this 
American intervention meant a decrease in national sovereignty for the individual 
nations. For most European nations this decision was not a difficult one. The economic 
situation was the crisis that must be solved. The speed with which Bevin acted after the 
proposal, besides being a very convincing testament to the severity of the economic 
problem in the United Kingdom in 1 947, shows how strongly he supported the British as 
well as all of Europe accepting the general conditions proposed by Marshall. Bevin heard 
16 Mee, Jr Charles L, The Marshall Plan: The launching of the Pax Americana p. 133 
17 IB!Dp.133 
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the proposal on the morning radio news, before noon he had met with members of his 
staff, received approval to proceed toward the i:eceiving of aid from Labour Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee, wired a response to Washington and wired Paris to set up a 
meeting proposing the action the two nations would take as a response to the Marshall 
Plan. Bevin suggested the meeting June 17th, only a week and a half after the speech was 
given. 18 The French agreed on the need for swift action. The American ambassador to 
France explained that "Bidault tells me he is not too happy about Bevin coming here at 
this junction because his visit is being interpreted here as a desire on Bevin's part to steal 
the show. He of course is upset because he wanted to steal the show."19 America was the 
richest nation in the world and they were offering their checkbooks as a solution to 
Europe's postwar economic problems. The Europeans understood that with this aid there 
would be at least some American involvement to follow. They would not accept this 
involvement blindly but they were in a situation that needed solving. In the American 
proposal they saw a solution and they took it, leaving ·details for later. 
The Marshall Plan forced a position on several issues by politicians from around 
the world. This is perhaps most true in regards to the Soviet Union. The Truman 
Doctrine, which President Truman implemented in 194 7 to combat communism in 
Greece and Turkey, was only weeks old when Molotov met with Bevin and Bidault 
regarding possible inclusion in the American aid package. 20 At this p9int there was no 
Cold War, but there was stress between the two former allies. Americans had accepted 
the cause in Greece, which may have been a starting point for the Cold War, but this was 
a less dramatic experience than we see it as now. The Truman Doctrine was so ne.w that 
18 Mee Jr. The Marshall Plan , p. 1 12. 
19 IBIDp.1 12 
20 IBID p. 133 
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nobody knew the shape that this foreign policy would actually take. By including the 
Soviets as a possible participant in the Marshall Plan, at least rhetorically, the United 
States showed that they were not hardliners towards them at this point. 
History would have doubtlessly flowed in a different direction had the USSR 
accepted the invitation into the Marshall Plan. Actually pondering the direction history 
would have taken is generally a fruitless endeavor, but in this case it was a semi-real 
possibility. First, ifthe Soviets accepted, it is likely that congress would not have passed 
funding for the Marshall Plan. The way it worked the· U.S politicians who has a 
formidable check on the situation had very little to worry about 21• Another point of view 
comes from Czechoslovakian foreign Minister Jan Masaryk: 
The real crux of the matter. The offer of credits to us and to the Poles is quite 
genuine . . .  but, as for credits for Russia, that is the biggest piece of eyewash in 
the whole scheme. Do you see Truman and Congress forkuig out billions of 
dollars to enemy number one, communist Russia from whom we all have to be 
saved?22 
Instead the United States used the chance to put the ball in the court of the Soviets, who 
had little possibility of acceptance of the aid anyways. 23 The Soviet reluctance in 
acceptance was based on several factors. First, as Molotov stated in his meeting with 
' 
Bevin and Bidault ill the end of June 1 947, it was unacceptable for the Soviets to lose any 
level ·of sovereignty.24 Furthermore, acceptance of American terms would put the 
communist based USSR soundly in the center of a process based on capitalist ideologies. 
Finally, there was Eastern European nations which the USSR had gained control of 
21 Schain, p. 123 
22 Mee Jr. p. 1 50 
23 IBID. p. 1 13 
24 IBID. p. 112 
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following World War II. From its new possessions, the Soviets would strip billions of 
dollars worth of goods to rebuild the USSR, the Soviets saw this· as reparations. The 
Soviets plan for economics recovery plan in reality was theft. It is likely that ifthe 
Soviets were included in the Marshall Plan they would not have been able to pillage 
Eastern Europe.in the same manner. Also, if the Soviets did accept the Marshall Plan aid 
they wo�ld not have received as much aid as they received from .the Eastern European 
nations. If the preceding statements are all true, as they appear to be, it was economically 
logical for the Soviets not to participate, they were able to receive more money on their 
own. Lastly, all this talk is possibly a waste based on the ideas of the U.S. The Americans 
took measures to insure that the Soviets would not accept the offer. Preceding the Soviet-
British-French meeting in Paris, Bevin was given instructions to make sure the 
communist Russians did not accept. As Averall Harriman, the U.S. Secretary of 
Commerce said, "Bevin did a superb job of getting Molotov out of Paris".25 Thus, the 
Soviets went home without aid from the United States. 
The.Eastern European nations under Soviet domination are also closely related to 
the Soviet Response to the Marshall Plan. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary all 
received invitations from the British and French to be part of the Committee of European 
Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and receive Marshall Plan aid. All three of these nations 
were poised to accept this offer, which was deemed unacceptable to the USSR. The 
Hungarian government told the American ambassador "we will be told what to do". 26 
This was the case for the other Eastern Bloc countries as well. The Soviets were strong 
enough to prevent these nations all from moving toward the west in any way. On July 
25 Mee Jr. p. 136. 
26 IBID pg. 149 
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12th, 1947 the Committee of European Economic Cooperation first met with no 
representation. from Eastern Europe.27 There was a division occurring between west and 
east, two, powerful and opposing sides. 
The response to the Marshall Plan by the European's was critical because of the 
breadth of the proposal and the complexity of the issues economically and politically in 
Europe in 194 7. While the amount of money to be given was not known at this point, in 
1947,_it was kno"Wn to be substantial.·Money can effect developments and the availability 
of money can affect politics. The Marshall Plan was part of the American international 
policy despite its cover as an economic policy. The nations of Eur.ope had to then respond 
to this change in American policy by assessing their own international and domestic 
go.als. These assessments would be in regards to the above-mentioned issues of the day. 
, 
The response to the Marshall Plan would be· critical because it would help define so many 
of the important issues between 194 7 and the conflict in Korea, which was the start of the 
"hot" Cold War. 
Did the British dominate the immediate response to the Marshall Plan? 
In examining the above question you must first look at the historical context of 
the Anglo-American relationship and placing a watchful eye on the events as they 
progr(issed from June 5th 1947 to December 1947. The answer is historically important 
because of the large aid package that was at stake. If one nation could dominate the 
response they would put their agenda at the forefront; more than one nation aspired to be 
the lead nation from the U.S. aid. A British domination in the response would suggest 
27 CEEC Vol. 1, pg. 7 
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superior politics, the most stable situation, a holdover of allied sympathy, or a degree of 
each. It was nearly certain that one nation would take the role of leader in the regards to 
the European establishmentofthe Marshall Plan. The British did fill that role, but if they 
dominated the· aid was more debatable, 
In examining the British role in the response to the Marshall Plan we are in large 
part dealing with the actions of Ernest Bevin. Bevin was the Foreign Secretary for Britain 
during the period of concern for·this paper. He was a socialist and a strong supporter of 
the Labour party. 28 This was his political party and also the party .in power in Britain 
from 1945-1951. Bevin was the decisive factor in British foreign policy at the time. 
Bevin himself was fond of calling the British foreign policy "my policy". 29 All historical 
renditions of Bevin attest to his authority in regards to foreign affairs in the period 
concerned. This does not mean he acted alone, without subordinate ihput, or foolhardily. 
Some historians have circumvented the questions as to where Bevin ends and others of 
his office began by referring to "Bevin and his advisors" or "the Foreign Secretary's 
office".30 The important establishment here is that British policy and Bevin's actions are 
virtually one in the same. This is consistent with most historians' views including Alan 
Bullock, author of a biography of Bevin. According to Bullock "Bevin was the originator 
of policy and the principle spokesman in Cabinet and Parliament.31 When British policy 
is referred to in this time period, one should think Bevin. When Bevin is described, 
British foreign policy is the topic. 
28 Bullock, Alan. Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary. p. 44 
29 Melissen, Jan & Zeeman, Bert. Britain and WesterlJ Europe, 1945-51: Opportunities Lost. Printed in 
International Affairs. Vol. 63, No. l. p. 82. 
30 IB!D p. 83 
31 Bullock. p.75. 
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From a broader perspective the position of the United Kingdom internationally at 
the end of WWII would also play a large role in their possible domination in the scheme 
of the European aspect of the Marshall Plan. Britain had been the nation of power in 
world. Their empire was the basis for becoming the most powerful nation in the world, a 
role they.had prospered from and enjoyed. Furthermore, the British were the only Allied 
Power that would receive aid once the Soviets walked out of the plan. The British felt 
that because they had persevered to the end and were victorious that they should be dealt 
with on an individual basis not grouped with the losers of continental Europe. 32 
There has also been a considerable amount of political action between the 
American's and the British in the years between WWII and the Marshall Plan offer. 
These negotiations, several of which were economically based help continue the 
American-British relationship that had developed during the war. These economic events 
began at Br�tton Woods in 1945, continued with the International Trade Organization 
(ITO) meetings of 1946-4 7 and also included the founding of the International Monetary 
Fund. These early developments gave the first glimmer of multilateralism that the 
Marshall Plan would find so important, bll;t were mostly British or American dominated 
meetings with limited developments. The British Loan is an example of the political and 
economic relationship in the immediate postwar, even before the Marshall Plan. Britain 
used its political connections to secure a $3.75 billion dollar loan in the old bilateral 
manner. No other country received this type of aid. While plans were being made for 
other bilateral aid packages the fact that Britain was the only one to receive an individual 
one is very suggestive of Britain holding the highest status with Washington. Another 
symbol of the British and American cooperation was the newly formed Bizone in 
32 Mee Jr. p. 1 25.  
1 8  
Germany. 33 This section of West Germany was a combination of British and American 
zones of occupation following WWII. The Americans were looking to foster relationships 
in Europe and Britain seemed to be the place with the most common ground. 
At this tinie in Europe, Britain was the most stable nation politically of the major 
nations in Europe. The French.were anther major force, because of their size and 
population, but P.aris was in turmoil following World War II. The communists were 
growing strong politically and a point of opposition from the left, while the right 
produced opposition to the government led by General Charles de Gaulle. The other two 
sizable populations were the Germans and the Italians.34 The Germans were obviously 
. not an option following WWII. Similarly, Italy had been a German ally and was now in 
serious danger from the communist regime leading its government. Therefore Britain was 
the obvious choice for leadership of the Marshall Plan from an American standpoint. This 
however did not mean that there were not weaknesses in the relationship between the 
U.S. and Britain. 
Britain was not safe from leftist leaders following WWII; they had a leader 
emerge following WWII from the Labour Party. Atlee had assumed power in 1945 
following the end of World War II. This would seem to have been a larger problem than 
it actually was. Bevin, a pro-American was largely in charge of the foreign policy of 
Britain. This meant the continuation of dialog between the two nations. The situation 
with Bevin and the Labour Party was mostly surrounding the relationship with the Soviet 
Union. Early in his term as Foreign Secretary Bevin made his famous quote "Left 
33 OEEC. p 1 87. 
34 Taeuber, Irene B, Postwar Emigration from Germany and Italy, _Annals of the American Academy of 
P olitical and Social Science. Vol. 262. pg. 84 
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understands Left". 35 This seemed to signal an increasing sympathy by the British towards 
the Soviets. The British were first prepared to have a· relationship with the Soviets. Soviet 
actions eventually made the relationship seem impossible to Bevin and the British. The 
aggression with which they acted in Eastern Europe along with the recognized power 
vacuum in Western Europe led the British to consider them a security threat. 36 Bevin, 
though disturbed by Soviet action was very patient. He very consciously kept the 
possibility of a relationship open with the Soviets until after the 194 7 Conference of 
Foreign Ministers, which ended in April. 37 
By June 5th 1947 the British were in position to be very accepting of the Marshall 
Plan aid. As Bevin said, "financial weakness has necessarily increased the need to 
coordinate our foreign policy with that of the only country which is able to effectively to 
wield extensive economic influence-namely the United States".38 The British economy 
was down and the possibilicy of a relationship with the Soviets_ was unlikely. Bevin saw 
this Marshall Plan proposal as a great possibility for Britain to prosper and would take the 
most active role in securing aid that could maintain a way of life for the British. Alan 
Bullock commented "Bevin's action in the next few days [after Marshall's speech] was 
his most decisive personal contribution to the history of the times".39 
The actual response to Marshall's speech is one of great significance. This is 
where Bevin is most crucial. His actions were quick and calculated. The opportunity for 
gain presented itself and his actions were designed to maximize this gain. His words to 
35 Weiler, Peter. British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governments 1945-
195 1 .  The Journal of British Studies. Vol. 26. No.I. p. 54 
36 Melissen J. and Zeeman B. P.85. 
37 Weiler, P. p.36. 
38 Weiler. P. p. 57. 
39 Bullock, A. p.404. 
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Loni Strang soon after he heard the news of the Plan· give his initial thoughts on the 
situation and help,explain the speed with which he moved to accept, they were, "We 
know what he. said. If you ask questions, you'll get answers you don't want. Our problem 
is what we do, not what he meant".40 These words along with the quick action Bevin 
would take suggest how excited he was at the possibility. He wanted to accept the offer 
before the Americans could change their minds, with t�e British agenda leading the 
course of the aid. 
Bevin then moved speedily for the.morning of June 6th, he wasn't sure what to do 
yet but knew he wanted to do something. The morning of the 6th, within hours of when he 
learned of Marshall's speech he was setting the stage for British domination of the Plan. 
He was doing so intentionally. He left his office after a quick, one-sided meeting with 
William.Strang, a British diplomat who served as a leading adviser to the British 
government during the 1940's, moved to Atlee's residence getting the leaders approval 
on proposing European action, wired America making it clear to Washington that he 
aimed to take the lead with the European response. He then wired the French to set up a 
meeting between the two greatest Western European nations. 41 
Only twelve days after Marshall's speech, there was a meeting between the 
FrencJ:;i government and U.S. officials. This meeting was another of Bevin's great moves 
toward domination of aid in Europe. He British and the French would obviously be of the 
dominating countries, but more likely they would be the two dominating countries in a 
European response. Bevin knew that ifhe could come to favorable terms with the French 
the two nations would be able to control whatever response was formulated. If he could 
40 Mee. Jr. p.112 
41 Mee. Jr. p. 112. 
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impose Britain'.s most important terms on the French at this stage, make enough 
concessions to them to gain their .support, he would have a good chance to dominate. The 
setup of the meeting was important, his actions at the meeting were obvioµsly more 
important. 
Bevin had arrived in Paris by June 1 6th and that night he had a meeting with his 
advisors. In this meeting with his advisors he gave his overall thoughts on the situation as 
well as giving the more specific goals of the meeting with the French that would occur 
the next day. 42 Generally he was bent on a British domination as much as possible. He 
knew that concessions would be necessary, but told his subordinates, "a British lead 
means British priority". 43 In reality a British lead would mean th�y must by unselfish, in 
this context it meant dealing with general European recovery. He then proposed his idea 
that would perhaps be his most important contribution and clear evidence of a British 
dominated CEEC. His proposal was of the form the committee would approxe. He would 
move for a leadership committee of a few high ranking politicians and a number of ad 
hoc subordinate committees to take care of day to day operations and formulation of 
necessary data. The small elite nature of the controlling committee would allow Britain to 
maneuver more easily and be good for speed of action, which Bevin valued because of 
economic difficulties domestically. In a small committee Britain could also better use its 
diplomatic expertise more effectively. The important fact here is not why Bevin would 
propose this type of form be taken, but that when the CEEC began a month later, the 
42 Mee. Jr. p. 118. 
43 IBID p. 114 
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form adopted was a virtual replication of Bevin's early proposal to his advisors.44 This is 
an important fact supporting British domination. 
The meeting witll the French on June 1 7th and 1 8th was Bevin indicating his 
simple thoughts on the course of action they shoud take together. He proposed the need 
for speed ,(because both countries needed money as soon as possible), the need for 
politically bypassing the UN to avoid slowing down the plan, and proposed his idea for 
the form that would be taken when all the countries met.45 All of Bevin's thoughts were 
accepted by Bidault and the French. Bevin again directed the course of action in this 
instance. Bidault made one important request however, because of the political situation 
in his country it was imperative to the French that the Soviets be invited to participate. 
Bevin understood the situation and· cooperated without question. The second key 
maneuver on his part was getting French assurance that although they needed the Soviets 
to be invited for political reasons that they would cooperate regardless of Soviet position. 
It was unlikely that the Soviets would accept the offer, therefore Bevin has nothing to 
worry about. Bidault assured their relationship with the Soviets regardless of Soviet 
involvement. 46 
Following the British-French meeting there was a bit of time before the two 
would meet again. The Americans would use this time to send George Kennan and Will 
Clayton to meet with the British to help ensure things moved in the appropriate direction 
for the U.S. The issues for the U.S. were an upcoming meeting between the British-
French-Soviets and the relationship they would have with the British. It was made clear 
to Bevin that although it was unlikely the Soviets would want to join, his job was to make 
44 CEEC. p. 8 
45 Mee Jr. p. 1 20 
46 Mee. Jr. p. 1 2 1 .  
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sure they did not. Bevin wants to ensure special treatment for the British as well and this 
is also discussed. The conclusions from this meeting"between the U.S. arid the British 
was twofold, eliminate the Soviets from the plan and get a European proposal drawn up. 
Only through the European proposal is the possibility for aid available. 47 The dialog here 
shows us the British values at this point. The relationship between the two nations is at a 
level where the Americans can reasonably expect Bevin to take the iniative of removing 
the Soviets from the response politically. While the Americans will not cede to Bevin's 
pressure for a special relationship per se, they do not in effect eliminate the idea of 
special treatment. They did however eliminate the idea of special treatment in a bilateral 
arrangement, but that left open the possibility of a British dominated response with 
British values at the forefront. Bevin preceded into the meeting with the French and 
Soviets with the possibility of a British dominated response as an option. The fact that the 
Americans were doing there work through the British is evidence of a leadership role at 
this point. Furthermore, it will help them maintain this role because of a cementing of the 
relationship with Washington. 
June 27th began four days of talks between the British, French, and Soviets. 
Supposedly this would be the meeting that would. set up the European response to the 
Marshall Plan. It certainly played an important role in the shape that response would take. 
The possibility of the Soviets accepting the American proposal was questionable. 
Molotov was generally uncooperative during the meeting. His views were from a 
different position than that of the Western Europeans. Truman had recently issued his 
doctrine declaring communism the enemy of American foreign policy. Molotov proposed 
ideas that seemed to be aimed at delaying or complicating the situation. He wanted to 
47 Mee Jr. p. 125. 
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himself consult with the Americans as to how muc� they were willing to give in aid, the 
British and French found this unnecessary. Molotov then went into negotiations over who 
would be included, most importantly raising the question of whether Germany would be 
part of the plan. At the third day of these meetings Bevin again assumed leadership. He 
drafts a proposal that he thinks the French will approve of and is apposed to the Soviet 
position.48 In effect Bevin is forcing the Soviets to agree to the. terms that he is proposing, 
or leave the meeting. The Soviets choose to leave after Bidault and Bevin will not engage 
in any more negotiations on the situation. This development was likely, but it was of 
extreme importance regarding the role the British would play. The British and the French 
had now been solidified as the leaders of the Marshall Plan. They would soon send 
invitations to the other governments of Europe to join the in August to for the CEEC. 
Without the Soviets the British and French had secured a large role in the formulation of 
the response in Europe. 49 Bevin had continued to fill the role of leader in driving the 
response while securing confidence from the Americans and French. His actions would 
be rewarded as the CEEC formed in August. 
The CEEC came together on August 12th 1 947. Delegates from Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom had responded to 
invitations from the Frehch and British to meet in Paris and remulate the response �at 
Marshall had requested, regarding a united European aid package. 50 The committee 
formed here would in actuality determine if Britain would be able to dominate the 
response or if they would merely be a player amongst others within the committee. The 
48M ee Jr. p. 134. 
49 CEEC Report p. 4 
50 IBID. p .. 5 
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first days of action help support the idea of the British domination. Bevin was elected 
chairman of the CEEC. His scheme was to have one high ranking committee make 
decisions. There were various other ad hoc committees to control general functions as 
well. There was a committee added for the reason of controlling the general function of 
operations, but it would not take any power from the small Executive Committee. 51 The 
Executive Committee itself continued to suggest the power role to the British The 
member countries of the Executive Committee were, Netherlands, and Norway, Italy, 
France, and of course Britain. 52 Bevin had become chairman of the CEEC, but perhaps 
the most important development in these early stages of the conference came when anther 
Englishman, Sir Oliver Franks, was allowed to head the Executive Committee. 53 This 
meant that the two highest ranking men at the conference were British. Bevin's goal of 
assuring the British lead was accomplished, if this would bring forward a British agenda 
was left to be seen. 
As the committee progressed the British would continue to play a driving role, but 
there would be questions about their domination. Where these mearly concessions on the 
part of the British for the appearance of the general good or was there a limit to the force 
they had in the European response? The specific ad hoc committees that would collect the 
relevant data were also Bevin's idea. 54 The goal of the committees was to appease the 
French interest enough because they knew if they worked together (The French and 
British) they would continue to keep the their agendas moving and would have to deal 
relatively little with other nations. A rule :was adopted by the CEEC that all decisions 
51 The American Journal of International Law, vol 43, No.2. p. 94 
52 IBID. p. 96 
53 Clayton, William L. GAAT, The Marshall Plan, and OECD. p. 497 
54 CEEC p. 14 
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must be unanimous. This rule hurt and helped the British. Now the smaller nations such 
as Greece and Luxembourg now had the same veto power as the leading nations, a 
regression in power. This aspect did-allow the British to take1:1. firmer line on some of the 
things they found important. The n�tions were all on agreement on the theory of 
multilaterism, but would not prioritize it ahead of domestic well being, the unanimity 
aspect of the terms allowed for this. 55 The response to the Marshall Plan was not mearly 
European. The Americans, despite their insistence that the response come from Europe, 
did play a large role in dictating terms for the Plan. The initial informal proposal by the 
Europeans was for $28.2 billion in aid. Caffery and Lovett were assigned to Paris to help 
the process move towards American terms. A member of the British diplomatic team 
said, "we wer.e working with the American . .. and knew what congress would pass. It was 
considerably less than the first indications of our requirements. So what we had to do in 
the program committee was press and press and press and get the requirements down. 56 
These examples show that America controlled the funding, so in reality they held the 
power as well. The Americans had still not received news of an acceptable number when 
Marshall himself pubicly let his views on the subject be known. He called for as many 
cuts as possible along, with the labeling of the report as preliminary and continuing the 
CEEC. In this·address h� also gave the possibility of interm aid because of the urgency of 
· 
the situation in Europe at the time. 57 This again shows us the power of the Americans. 
The actions proposed by MarshalL were nearly mirrored by the CEEC. The new American 
leadership infringed on the power previously held by the British. The effect was 
· ss Shain, p.28 . 
s6 Hoffman. p. 43 
s7 Mee Jr. p. 200 
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compounded by the fact that .Marshall's reasoning was accented by 1 5  other nations. 58 
The smaller nations were hoping for a more multilateral agreement that the Americans 
wanted, this was largely centered around convertibility. This meant that it would be 
possible for the small nations to prosper at the British expense. The French on the other 
hand were swayed by the possibility of interim aid. Bevin was thus left alone and 
concessions soon followed. 
The answer to the question "did the British dominate the European Response" is 
two layered. In a large part they did. Bevin and the British established the leadership role 
quickly with early well calc1:1lated action. They dealt strategically with the French, 
disposed of the Soviets, while.improving their relationship with the U.S. British ideas 
were found leading throughout the structure and proposal of the CEEC, which was also 
dominated by British leadership. The weakness in this argument in the role the 
Americans played in the European response. With such a roll played, possibily 
necessarily by the Americans, there may have been no chance for domination. In 
conclusion, the British played the role of leader in Europe in regards to the response to 
the· Marshall Plan. The British, in large part Ernest Bevins, dominated the initial response 
to the Americans, in regards to final product the British role is diminished substantially 
while they, remain the leader in Europe. 
What did the European response bring to Europe through the plan? 
In 1 948, Marshall Plan money began flowing into Europe. In total $13 .3 billion 
was made available to the sixteen participating governments. 59 The immediate goal of the 
58 IBID. p. 201 
59 Marshall Foundation. www.marshallfoundation.org . p. 3 
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Marshall Plan was to increase prpduction. Increased production did occur. By 1950, 
prewar levels were met. In many instances these levels were reached far sooner than the 
goals set.60 Though at first observation this seems to defend the causes of the Marshall 
Plan, it is not necessarily true. Production was so low after the war and economic 
conditions so dire, they would probably have recovered, at least to some degree 
regardless of American action. Simply by reallocating the distribution from the military 
to domestic spending in the post war, gains would be likely. The changes that were most 
important were those regarding a multilateral Europe. The meant developments 
economically and politically. 
The multilat�ral question was dealt with in a large degree in the age of the 
Marshall Plan. The CEEC had set the president of a multilateral organization drawing up 
economic plans for Europe as a whole. The OEEC, was·the name given to the CEEC 
council after the Marshall Plan actually began. Once the aid was proposed there were 
serious questions as to whether there would be real multilateral action or whether they 
plan was more of a combination of shopping lists from member nations. The countrj.es 
were qui.ck to move towards customs unions and multilateral solutions as long as the 
terms of actions were left relatively undefined as they were in the CEEC plan. 61 The 
British were particularly unwilling to give up any of their sovereignty in regards to a 
multilateral Europe. The biggest development of this era regarding multilateralism was 
the European Payments Union or EPU. This allowed countries to figure their debts or 
surpluses in regards to Europe as a whole and decreased the need for bilateral trade 
60 Marjolin, Robert. The Economic Recovery of Europe. p. 3 
61 CEEC General Report. Chapter 2. 
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agreements. 62 This idea was a legitimate step toward European integration. The EPU 
dealt with 3 .2 billion in debts and surplus' in its first year (July 1 950-June 1 95 1 ), 2. 1 
billion of that was dealt with through accounting practices of the EPU, leaving only a 
third to be dealt with bilaterally.63 The European Coal and Steel Community also referred 
to as the Sherman Plan, was developed by the French because of their desire to be a 
leader in the steel industry. For this they needed raw material and they proposed free 
trade of these goods in a document outside the realm of the OEEC. Six nations joined 
including Germany and Italy, Britain however did not join. The w� another small step 
towards multilaterism. 
The politics in relation to the Marshall Plan are obviously difficult to discern . 
because of all the other events in the world at this time. Actions that are related are not 
necessarily cause or effect relations to the American aid, but merely related. These 
political ideas specifically refer to the role of Germany, the Soviets, The Cold War, and 
Britain's role. Germany had not been included at the CEEC, there numbers were included 
in the requirements for aid. This was done because it was understood that German 
production was necessary to a successful European economy.64 They had traditionally 
been trading partners with all of Europe and there would be a hole in the European 
economy without them. The French understood this position, but were at first skeptical 
because of what these concessions might mean politically. Bidault was originally very 
disturbed by the idea of Germany being of central interest to the rebuilding process. 65 
Germany understood that their method of political acceptance would not come in the way 
62 European Payments Union. First annual report. P. 78. 
63 IBID. p. 79 
64 Mee. Jr. p. 140. 
65 IBID. p. 133 
30 
of economic relationships. This is supported by their inclusion in numerous other smaller . 
economic cooperations. From here the Franco-German relationship has continued to 
grow. 
The Marshall Plan helped define the Cold War. The Soviet exit from the Marshall 
Plan along with their satellite countries increased the clarity of the polarization that was 
occurring the years between the end of WWII and Korea. The response to the Marshall 
Plan put countries into either the American camp or the Soviet camp. They were in reality 
already there, as the domination of the Soviets in regard to the Eastern European 
countries acceptance shows, but this drew the line more clearly at a point when that was 
not easy to do. Also, a possible point of further study would be examining the role the 
American's played in eliminating the Soviets in their meeting with the French and 
British. They obviously played a role, but the reasons are not well defined at this point. 
Britain had little choice but to accept the Marshall Plan because of its economic 
situation at home and its international goals; to do both of these they needed money. 
Britain thus prospered because of the Marshall Plan. Politically they demonstrated that 
they were still a leader, as they fulfilled that role within the European response. The aid 
that they received allowed for domestic levels of consumption to stay the same while the 
economy rebuilt and money was still left for them to pursue their international goals, 
albeit temporarily. In doing so they also had secured ties with the Americans. This was 
increasing in likelihood as time passed in the few years after WWII and was finally 
accepted as completely necessary by Bevin after the 1 9_47 Foreign Secretary meetings. 
America had needed an ally in Europe and British action regarding the Marshall Plan 
seemed to give that to them. The Marshall Plan solidified the Anglo-American 
3 1  
relationship upon which both foreign policies continue to be deeply sympathetic to. For 
evidence of this relationship look no further than the recent events regarding Iraq. Again 
the Americans lead and the British accepted their view internationally choosing to take 
the side of the largest economic superpower, hopefully molding it to fit them best. 
While the Marshall Plan had several real effects its immediate accomplishments 
are overshadowed by its groundbreaking for the future. The European response provided 
a basis from while continued integration could operate. The continuation of the OEEC 
was a major development as a place for the advancement of multilateral ideas in Europe. 
Of the first 15 members of the Eur0,pean Union, 13 of them received Marshall Plan aid. 
The exceptions were Spain and Finland. Turkey is the only country to be part of the 
Marshall Plan and not a member of the European Union. Finally, only Liechtenstein is a 
member and not part of the Marshall Plan. There is clearly substantial overlap between 
the Marshall Plan and the liberalized European economy we know today. 
32 
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Since the conclusion of World War II, the United States has been involved in 
providing foreign aid to nations in need. In his farewell address, our first President 
George Washington, provided his thoughts on foreign affairs by saying he "discouraged 
his successors from getting involved in foreign affairs". However, he knew of the 
potential benefits and importance in maintaining positive foreign relations, including 
offering and accepting foreign aid. This hesitation about becoming involved in foreign 
affairs has continued over time, though our role in the world has been molded toward 
becoming more actively involved. Following the end of the Second World War, the 
United States' role in the world changed drastically and left the United States a 
superpower with the ability to influence countries all over the globe with our economic 
superiority through foreign aid. By definition, foreign aid can be described as "economic, 
military, technical, and financjal assistance given on an international and usually 
intergovernmental level".66 Although the government occasionally gives the impression 
that we regularly achieved the desired results anticipated from our foreign spending, the 
reasons.for offering foreign aid have changed considerably in the almost sixty years 
following the commencement of our foreign spending. 
· Many advocates for foreign aid seem to lack concrete reasoning as to why foreign 
aid is so important, yet they continue to push for increased amounts year in and year out. 
Although the United State's has given over $500 billion in foreign aid since 1 946, much 
of the money given out has been squandered away or spent haphazardly in places such as 
Vietnam or Iraq. When examining U.S. foreign aid over time one can conclude that the 
U.S. has two main reasons for providing money to needy countries. Most of the money 
the U.S.  gives out is either given for humanitarian reasons or to help promote the self-
66 Columbia Electronic Encycl opedia, 6th ed. 2007, Columbia University Press. 
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interest of the United States, with most of the aid packages fall ing into the second 
category.67 While exploring the history of U.S .  foreign aid over time, it can be concluded 
that we have gone on different paths with our foreign spending. Presently our foreign aid 
is being al located to stabil ize Iraq and in my opinion make it a place for a new Marshal l 
Plan in the Middle East. I n  doing this it would be a comparison to the enormously 
successful Marshall Plan fo llowing World War I I .  (The trend of U.S .  spending can be 
seen on the graph below, figure 7).68 
Figure 7. U . S .  Foreig n  Aid :  FY1 946 - FY2005 
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·Why Foreign Aid? 
Ever since the idea of foreign aid was introduced by the Truman administration, 
people have asked the question of "why foreign aid?" The American people want to 
know why their hard earned dollars are being taken from them and shipped to places 
throughout the world where they cannot see the results of this spending. The government 
answers the question that foreign aid is needed to "defend U.S interests and promote 
long-term development abroad"69• In doing this, the government hopes to win support for 
its programs at home and to keep the spending affordable to the general public. 70 Public 
support towards foreign aid has varied over time and will continue to when the U.S. 
spends its money to promote the interests of a few people, such as political officials, 
while disregarding the ideas of their constituents. The citizens of the United States are 
overwhelmingly against the conflict in Iraq, yet this continues to move on regardless of 
what the people want. One economic theorist, Robert Packenham, said this about foreign 
aid, "It's a fact of Life" 71 • In other words, we should just get used to it. Another 
economics theorist, Hans Morgenthau states that a foreign policy without foreign aid can 
be a waste of time and will result in very little change. Therefore, in order to pursue the 
United States foreign policy, money must ·be spent. 72 Ultimately, the amount of money 
spent on foreign aid is considerably less than people think when looked at in depth. 
If you were to examine the amount of money the United States currently gives in 
foreign aid, you will quickly see that in terms of dollars and cents the U.S. gives the most 
69 Obey, David R and Lancaster, Carol Funding Foreign Aid .. Foreign P oli cy, No.71 .  (Summer, 1 998) 
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and is regarded as the world's  largest economic donor well ahead of France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom (figure 1 1 ). 73 
Figure 1 1 .  Economic Aid in Dollars from Major 
Donors, 2003 
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Upon deeper investigation though, when you factor in the amount the U.S .  gives 
per citizen as compared to other nations we drop to a mere l 61h place behind countries 
such as Denmark, New Zealand, and Luxembourg. In 2004 the U.S .  gave approximately 
$5 1 per citizen per year in foreign aid, which puts us well behind the top donor in this 
category, Denmark, who donates $3 8 1  per citizen.74 When measuring aid as a share of a 
nation's  income (Gross Domestic Income-GNI),  the U . S  ranks even worse among the top 
22 donors, placing us dead last at 0. 1 3% of our nation' s  income allocated to foreign aid.75 
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This can be seen in figure 1 2 .76 A good analogy of the United States spending in 
comparison with these smaller countries as a percent of the Gross National Income would 
be l ike a person making minimum wage giving $ 1 00 dollars of their income while Bil l  
Gates gives $ 1 .  
Figure 1 2. Economic Aid as 0/o of GNI from Major 
Donors, 2002 
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Another interesting observation is that throughout history the percent of our Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) spent on foreign aid has dropped since its peak in 1 948, when 
approximately 3% of our GDP was spent on foreign aid. 77 Most recently, in 2004 our 
GDP was 0. 1 8%. 78 The only time that the decline in aid does not hold true was during 
international conflicts such as Korea and Vietnam, when foreign spending sl ightly 
76 Tarnoff, Curt and Nowels, Larry. CRS Report for Congress. 1 9  January 2005. Library of Congress. 
Foreign Aid:  An Introductory Overview of U .  S. Programs and Pol icy. 
www.fcp.state.gov/documents/organization/45939.pdf 
77 I B I D. 
78 I B ID,  pp.33 
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increased. Anther time period of significance was fol lowing the end of the Cold War in 
which the U.S.  foreign spending drops to record lows. (See figure 8, below)79 
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When examining the time period in which our foreign aid was highest, it is thought that 
the American people cannot see the results of al l this spending. According to Aurelius 
Morgner, an economist, all of this spending has helped the government promote United 
States self-interests. This is evident in the foreign aid spending in the early 1 950's  
through the mid 1 960's. It can be concluded that al l  of our foreign aid has done one thing, 
kept us out of a nuclear war80. There are no tangible examples that the American public 
can see except that the Cold War never fully developed into an active conflict between 
the U.S .  and the Soviet Union. Before examining any further what benefits the foreign 
79 Tarnoff, Curt and Nowels, Larry. CRS Report for Congress. 1 9  January 2005. Library of Congress. 
Foreign Aid:  An I ntroductory Overview of U .  S. Programs and Policy. 
www. fcp.state.gov/documents/organization/45939.  pdf 
80 Morgner, Aurel ius. The American Foreign A id Program: Costs, Accompl ishments, Alternat ives? . . The 
Review of Politics. Vol . 29, No. I .  (Jan., 1 967). Pp. 69 
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spending has hfill on our nation, one needs to take a look back to when and where·United 
States foreign policy started. 
In the· Beginning 
The history of the United States' foreign aid began at the end of World War II. 
Most of Europe was in ruins and the only powers left standing were two competing 
nations with very different ideas of how to lead a country. The United States and the 
Soviet Union were left as the two world superpowers and each had conflicting ideologies; 
democracy in the U.S. and communism/socialism in the Soviet Union. France and 
Britain, the old world powers were in need of help and restructuring along with the 
majority of Western Europe. The United States came to their rescue. During a speech to 
. 
graduates at the commencement for Harvard University on June 5th 1 947, Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall spoke of his goals for post war Europe. From these ideas the 
Marshall Plan was born. The goal of the Marshall Plan was to provide money to any 
European nation who requested it in the hopes ofreviving Europe's economy and return 
to pre-World War II production. While provi�ing this plan, the Unites States asked all · 
interested nations to devise � aid package they felt was acceptable. Marshall felt that the 
goals and values of the European nations seeking aid were of utmost importance. 
· In the winter of 1 94 7, one of the coldest and harshest on record, Europe was in 
dire need of support. In 1 948, $ 1 3  .3 billion was made available to sixteen participating 
nations. The results were drastic and by 1 950 agricultural and industrial production in 
Europe was back to pre-World War II levels. 8 1  
81 Marshall Foundation. www.marshallfoundation.org pg. 3 
4 1  
The contrast between the Marshall Plan and other economic aid plans that the 
United States became involved in was that unlike most of the places that received aid, the 
nations that benefited from the Marshall Plan already had an economic structure in place, 
it just needed to be repaired. In contrast to the current plan for Iraq, we are trying to use 
our money to improve their economy, but have to re-create an economy before we can 
' 
move forward. The economy of Iraq is led by their chief export of crude oil. Prior to the 
Iraq invasion in Kuwait in 1 990, which led to the Persian Gulf War, oil production levels 
were around 3 .5 million barrels of oil per day. Following the United Nations invasion of 
Iraq, the production levels dropped to approximately 300,000 barrels per day. In order to 
ensure the success of the economy of Iraq, oil production levels needed to return to pre-
1 990 levels. 82 Another key issue that needed to be addressed was that Iraq's banking 
sector and financial system was also in need to serious rebuilding. 83 
Starting in 1 947 with the Marshall Plan or European Recovery Program, the 
United States began to spend approximately one to three percent of our Gross Domestic 
Product on foreign aid. The United States felt that helping the countries in need would 
not only benefit all nations involved, but also it could take the burden off the U.S. as the 
strongest nation in the world by letting other nations produce goods high in demand. 
Also, following the end of World War II, the United States was instrumental in beginning 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank). With the creation of both of these organizati.ons, the 
goal for these groups would be to help with debt relief and economic development of 
82 Crocker, Bathsheba. Reconstructing Iraq's Economy. The 
'
washington Quarterly. Autumn 2004. p.78-80. 
83 IBID. pg. 76 
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Europe. The U.S. hoped to not only assist countries to rebuild following World War II, 
but also to help in strengthening relationships with the benefiting corintries. 84 
During the time period before the implementation of the Marshall Plan, Europe as 
described by some historians, was in a period of distress. The �ftermath of the First 
World War's post war depressl.on was still fresh in the minds of Europeans. Most 
European nations were riot producing goods at the pre-World War II rate and some 
people were in a state of panic. Therefore the immediate goal of the Marshall Plan was to 
increase production throughout Europe while stimulating economic growth. At this time 
the United States offered and distributed $ 1 3.3 billion dollars of aid to sixteen different 
recipient nations in a four-year period. 85 This funding package was well under the 
proposed aid package originally attempted, which was around $23 billion dollars. 86 It is 
important to note that the dollar amount of the aid package provided by the U.S .  was 
requested by the European nations involved in the Marshall Plan, it was not an amount 
selected by President Harry S. Truman. It seemed however that Truman expected the cut 
of his original proposed aid package. In October 1 947, Truman commented as to why he 
allowed then Secretary of State George Marshall to put his name on the plan and not let 
this plan bear his (Truman's) own name. Truman was quoted, "Can you imagine [the 
plan's] chances of passage in an election year in a Republican Congress if it is named for 
Truman and not Marshall?"87 Nevertheless, the Marshall Plan moved forward with just 
over 1 3  billion dollars in �ding available to Europe. It is not surprising to see that of the 
nations receiving benefits, the top five nations were countries who were economic 
84 Baltimore County Public Schools. www.bcps.org/offices/lis/models/forejgnaid/history.html 
85 Schain, Martin A. The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After. Pp. 120. 
86 Crawley, Vincent. Marshall Plan for Rebuilding Europe Still Echoes After 60 Years. May 2 1 •1, 2007 U.S. 
Department of State, USINFO. Online Edition. http://usinfo.state.gov 
87 Truman, Harry S. Political Speech responding to questions of the Marshall Plan funding. Oct. 1947. 
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powers prior to World War II and needed to be rebuilt quickly in the eyes of the U.S. The 
United Kingdom received the most aid with $3.2 billion, followed by France at $2.2 
billion, Germany at $ 1 .4, Italy at $ 1 .2 and The Netherlands at $ 1 . 1  billion 88 
Following the disbursement of money from the Marshall Plan the economies of 
the nations of Europe began to grow at an amazing rate. From the years 1 948-52 Europe 
recorded its fastest economic growth ever and by 1 952 agricultural and industrial 
production exceeded pre War levels. There are many disagreements about how large a 
role the Marshall Plan played in the European recovery. Most historians say at the least 
that the Marshal Plan provided a jump start to the European economy in the post-World 
War II time period. 89 Figure 2 shows just how much European nations GDP grew in the 
time after World War II, during the Marshall Plan Years, with Germany and Austria 
leading the way. 90 
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Under President Truman, foreign aid increased dramatically. After the success of 
the Marshall Plan, the United States began to spread its influence throughout other parts 
of the world, such as Korea, Vietnam and the Middle East. In the eyes of the United 
States, foreign policy was no longer limited to economic aid, it now was a way to spread 
our influence and ideologies as well. 
Types of Foreign Aid 
When looking at the expansion of the U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid in 
general, the aid given out can be·broken down into six main categories. The six different 
types of aid are humanitarian foreign aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, 
bribery,. prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development. 91 When you 
look deeper into these different categories, you can conclude that aside from 
humanitarian foreign aid, the other five are all ways in which the government is 
promoting its own self-interest. 
Humanitarian aid is usually given to nations in need as a result of natural disasters 
such as hurricanes, floods, and epidemics. Although usually non-political, humanitarjan 
aid can have political effects once the money is given.92 Humanitarian aid is widely 
criticized because outside sources view this type of aid as a way of gaining an element of 
control over the recipient nation from the donor nation.93 Currently, the most common 
91 Morgenthau, A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. Pp. 301 . 
92 IBID. pp. 302 
93 McKinlay, R.D. & Little R. A Foreign Policy Model of U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocation. World Politics. 
October 1 977, vol. XXX, No. 1 .  Princeton University Press. Pp. 59. 
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instance of the United States giving out humanitarian aid is the money given to combat 
AIDS in African nations. 
The second type of foreign aid is subsistence aid. This type of aid is usually given 
to foreign governments who are in debt. Subsistence aid is typically given to keep the 
status quo in the recipient nation. This type of aid can be given when the receiver 
government doesn'.t have the funds to provide its people with the necessary resources for 
instance social programs providing basic necessities such as food and shelter.94 Again 
this type of aid has historically been given to nations of Africa. 
Bribery-is another type of foreign aid provided. When foreign aid was just 
beginning to take off, bribery was a .great way to help out a nation in need and to also 
promote the giving nations interests. Morgenthau concluded that much of what has been 
given out in aid historically by the United States was by nature, a bribe. The bribes could 
be both economic and political in terms of what the giving nation was trying to achieve. 
Politically, governments can demand that the receiving nation immediately succumb to 
their demands or risk losing aid. This was the case in Vietnam and followed the U.S. idea 
of containment. Economically speaking, countries trying to improve the output of their 
industry will take bribes to improve machinery and in return they provide the giving 
nation with preferential trade agreements and low tariffs. 95 
Military aid is another form of foreign aid used. For most countries military aid is 
the largest share of aid given. It can be concluded that military aid is the most common 
way that a government promotes its self-interest. Going back in history to the Romans, 
94 Morgenthau, A Political Theory ofForeign Aid. Pp. 302 
95 IBID pp. 302 
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military aid has always been a way "by which nations buttress their alliances".96 Military 
aid is primarily exchanged to gain political advantage in a country. By giving out military 
foreign aid we are doing so in exchange for the receiving country to essentially accept 
our political views and adapt these views to their own nations. In the early 1 990's the 
U.S. provided tltjs type of aid to Kuwait to help defend them from Iraq. 
Another type of aid, which, like bribery, has hidden meaning, is prestige aid. 
Prestige aid is aid given to a nation to provide it with ·advancements that are not 
necessarily a necessity of that nation, but make the donor nation look better. Examples of 
such aid are ''the unprofitable or idle steel mill, the highway without traffic and leading 
nowhere, the airline operating with foreign personnel and at a loss, but under the flag of 
the recipient nation" 97 All of these examples are great improvements if built at the right 
time, but a nation in a severe economic depression would have no function for such 
improvements. Many instances of prestige aid have taken place in underdeveloped and 
undereducated parts of Latin America and Africa. A question that may arise about this 
type of aid is: Why provide this aid and waste money if the recipient nation is not 
benefiting? Morgenthau,states that the answer to that question has three parts to it. First, 
the aid will most likely provide the giver nation with "a specific political advantage in 
return for the aid".98 Secondly, the prestige aid establishes an exclusive relationship 
between the generosity of the giver and the increased prestige of the recipient. Lastly, 
prestige aid comes relatively cheaply to the giver nation, but can give them enormous 
prestige. 
96 IBID. pp. 303 
97 IBID. pp. 303 
98 IBID. pp. 304 
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The last and most important type of aid is foreign aid for economic development. 
The Marshall Plan, which was the most famous instance of U.S. foreign aid, is an 
example of foreign aid for economic development. The success of the Marshall Plan led 
the United States and especially President Truman to expand U.S foreign policy and get 
the U.S. involved in new locations throughout the world. 
Shift in United States Foreign Policy 
Following the success of the Marshall Plan, President Truman decided to continue 
providing aid for economic development, but shifted from rebuilding industrialized 
nations post World War II to underdeveloped nations. In a short period of time in the 
early 1 950's the United States quickly changed their foreign policy from "aid for 
reconstruction to aid for development to buttress our military support". 99 This shift of 
foreign aid was signed by President Truman on October 1 0th, 1 95 1  and was called the 
Mutual Security Act of 1 95 1 .  This was an extension of the Foreign Economic Assistance 
Act also signed by Truman, in June of 1 950. 100 The Foreign Economic A&sistance Act did 
five things in terms of foreign aid. This act continued the Marshall Plan, continued aid to 
Korea, southeast Asia, and non-communist China, provided a program of relief and 
public works to" Arab refugees from Palestine, provided technical assistance to help build 
up economically underdeveloped areas and lastly it continued the United States support 
for the United Nations. 10 1  
99 Morgner, Aurelius. The American Foreign Aid Program: Costs, Accomplishment. Alternatives?. Pp. 66. 
100 Truman, Harry S. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Foreign Assistance Act. June 51h, 1950. 
Taken from The American Pres idency Project [ online] www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
101 IBID 
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The purpose of this new Mutual Security Act was to "assist free peoples around 
the world who want to develop and safeguard their freedom and maintain the peace."1 02 
The Mutual Security Act was to provide military equipment for troops who wanted to 
defend their homelands, provide natural resources and equipment for factories to build 
defense weaponry, medical supplies, and many other things for underdeveloped areas 
who wanted to grow, mainly in South American countries. 103 This aid was now available 
to countries close to the Soviet Union and China, a new threat. The Mutual Security Act 
was extended to Turkey, Pakistan, Taiwan and Korea. The Mutual Security Act was a 
bust from an economic standpoint. Unlike the aid provided to nations as a part of the 
Marshall Plan, these nations did not have preexisting economies prior to World War II 
that were in need of repair. In contrast to the economic results, militarily though the 
Mutual Security Act was a success in that it provided the above-mentioned nations with 
needed additional security. 1 04 The foreign policies of President Truman would help to 
shape the foreign policy of many of the presidents to succeed him by shaping how 
foreign aid would be spent in the second half of the twentieth century. 
When President Truman ended his two terms in office he was followed by Dwight 
D. Eisenhower. Throughout the course of his presidency President Eisenhower brought 
U.S. foreign spending amounts to a new low. Many of the policies that Eisenhower 
pursued began following the cry that Truman and the Democrats were "soft on 
communism"1 05 With that being their platform, the Eisenhower presidency was hard on 
102 Truman. Harry S. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Mutual Security Act. October 10th, 195 1. 
Taken from The American Presidency Project [online] www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
103 IBID 
104 Morgner, Aurelius. The American Foreign Aid Program: Costs, Accomplishment. Alternatives?. Pp. 66 
105 Rabe, Stephen G. The Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism. 
University of North Carolina Pr ess. 1988. 
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the idea of containment. Eisenhower followed this policy because he believed in the 
domino theory. This theory said that if one nation fell to communism, everyone around 
them. would fall too. The domino theory especially worried Eisenhower when communist 
forces defeated French armies in Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam. This conflict ended by the 
Geneva Convention resulted in the dividing of Vietnam at the 1 7th parallel. In addition, 
in the Middle East, conflict arose between Egypt Great Britain over control of the Suez 
Canal. The U.S. withdrew financial support from the area and before the Soviet Up.ion 
could come in to muddy the waters even more, the United Nations took control of the 
crisis and a major war was averted. Lastly, in Eisenhower's attempt towards containment, 
the U.S.  was caught spying on the Soviet Union in the U2 incident. During this time, 
Eisenhower denied the existence of the spy planes, but once undisputable evidence was 
presented in the form of Gary Powers, the pilot of the shot down spy plane, Eisenhower 
told the truth and added to the Cold War conflicts making things even more hostile. 
In terms of economic development, Eisenhower was credited for the conversion 
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C), to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) 106 The purpose of this 
organization was a continued commitment to democracy and the market economy. This 
organization is made up of thirty member countries and helped needy nations continue 
with economic growth. The member nations also helped provide financial stability and 
assist other countries with economic development in needy nations. 107 Democrat John F. 
Kennedy who would try to change the foreign policy of the U.S. to fit the new decade, 
the sixties, followed Eisenhower's eight years in office. 
106 www.oecd.org/history 
107 www.oecd.org/about. 
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Following the overwhelming support that President Eisenhower received from the 
House and Senate in regards to foreign aid, President Kennedy had high hopes of support 
for his campaign towards foreign aid as well108. JFK sees our need for foreign aid in the 
interest of keeping up with the Soviet Union and not allowing communism to spread. 
Kennedy also was able to see all that has gone wrong in U.S. foreign aid over time. In a 
speech to Congress on March 22nd 1 96 1 ,  Kennedy outlined his plan for future foreign 
policy. President Kennedy was able to see the inadequate foreign policy of the past by · 
saying "Existing foreign aid programs and concepts are largely unsatisfactory and 
unsuited to our needs and for the needs of the underdeveloped world as it enters the 
· · si),'.ties." 109 JKF states that as a great power it is our obligation to protect the 
underdeveloped nations throughout the world, since if we do not help, they will be under 
communist pressure. The foreign policy of JFK was "in the southern half of the globe as 
in the north--economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand"1 10• 
This idea of helping people in the southern hemisphere led President Kennedy to pursue 
his Alliance for Progress plan. Alliance for Progress was established in 1 96 1  and was 
created to promote economic cooperation between North and South America. It was 
intended to counter the perceived emerging communist threat from Cuba and increase the 
standard of living in South America. 1 1 1  At the time that the Alliance for Progress was 
passed, the Cuban Missile Crisis had not even begun, yet the President knew Cuba was a 
threat. President Kennedy knows that this plan would not be easy to accomplish, but 
108 Kennedy, John. F. Statement bx the President Urging Bipartisan Support for Long-Term Foreign Aid. 
The Amer ican Presidency Project. www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
109 Kennedy, John F. Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid. Th e Amer ican Presidency Project . 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu. Pp. 1 
1 1 0  IBID. pp. 2 
1 1 1  Alliance for Progress. The Columbia Encyclopedia .  ( 6). 200 1 .  
5 1  
urged Congress to help him in turning beyond the "troubled history of foreign aid to the 
underdeveloped world"l l2 The presidency of John. F. Kenn�dy was cut short by his 
assassination; therefore he was never able to see the results of his new foreign policy 
programs. 
Following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson 
took over the presidency. During his presidency, Johnson will see a decline in foreign aid 
as a percent of our nations GDP, yet the nation will become more involved in the conflict 
in Vietnam. This decline in foreign spending was warranted though. During his time as 
president, Johnson was concentrating on creating programs that would benefit the U.S. 
citizens through his "Great Society" program. He added new legislation such as 
Medicare, Medicaid, aid to education, and war on poverty. President Johnson continues 
the foreign policy of JEK and will carry on Kennedy's anti-communist movement. 
Additionally President Johnson would exude his presidential power by issuing the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution in 1 964 giving him the power without approval by congress to use 
military action in Southeast Asia. This controversifl} resolution gave President Johnson 
unprecedented power on foreign affairs in a very volatile part of the world. In his·foreign 
budget for 1 965, Johnson called for $ 1 .7 billion dollars to go towards military assistance 
for eleven countr\es that border the Communist bloc. The u.se of these funds was intended 
to help the nations involved to resist the potential for a Soviet attack. In contrast to 
presidents before him, Johnson saw the need to solve problems at home and in 1 968, 
proposed the smallest foreign aid budget in the history of foreign policy. He did this 
because he felt that there were other more important needs at home and conflicts abroad 
112 Kennedy, John F. Special Message to the .Congress on Foreign Aid. The American Presidency Project. 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu. Pp. 3 
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that needed help outside economic aid. 1 13 Throughout the next thirty years our nations % 
GDP spent towards foreign aid would ·continue to shrink until it reached its all time low 
in 1997' at 0. 1 6%. 
Present Day Foreign Aid 
Throughout time the reasons for United States foreign policies has changed 
drastically. When comparisons are made between current day foreign policy and past 
practices there are some similarities between the Marshall Plan following World War II 
and the current policy of rebuilding Iraq. Although there is still much to be done in Iraq 
and only time will tell if what the U.S. did there actually benefited the country there are 
some noteworthy comparisons worth examining. Leading up to the war in Iraq, United 
States foreign aid had continued on a slight decline since the end of the Cold War. 
Following the attacks on September 1 1 th, 2001 ,  United States' aid increased with an 
enlarged amount of money going to Iraq. If you look back a mere 1 3  years from today, 
Iraqi spending did not even make the United States list of top 1 5  nations receiving aid. 
Yet in 2004 the amount spent in Iraq was more than seven times the closest beneficiary 
nation. (See figures 3 and 4) 1 14 
1 13 Johnson, Lyndon B. Recorded Remarks in Support of the Foreign Aid Bill. The American Presidency 
Pr oject. www.presidency.ucsb.edu. Pp. 3 
1 14 Tarnoff, Curt and Nowels, Lany Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview ofU. S. Programs and Policy . .  
CRS Report for Congress. 19 January 2005. Library of Congress. 
www .fcp.state.gov/documents/organization/45939 .pdf 
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Following the start of the War in Iraq, the United States estimated the total bill  of 
the war in Iraq to cost in the $200 billion dol lar range, but by the end of 2003 the bill for 
Iraq was already at a staggering $79 billion, with President George W. Bush asking for 
another $87 bil l ion to continue post war efforts, which put the U .S .  budget almost near 
the total bill estimate within two years of the war beginning. Of this money, much of it 
was going to maintaining our own troops, with $65 .5  bil lion going to the armed forces, 
and an additional $ 1 5  bil l ion toward rebuilding Iraq. 1 1 5 This $ 1 5  billion dollars j ust to 
begin rebui lding Iraq is more than the amount spent on the entire Marshall Plan. (These 
two amounts can be compared, but it needs to be addressed that the $ 1 3 .3  bill ion spent on 
the Marshall Plan in 1 94 7- 1 95 1 ,  when factored to current amounts would be 
approximately $ 1 00 billion.) Many people are cal l ing for the United States to turn Iraq 
1 1 5 Stevenson, Richard W. The Struggle for Iraq: U.S. Budget ; 78% of Bush 's Postwar Spending P lan is for 
Mi litary . .  The New York Times. Online Edition. Pp. 1 .  
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into anther Marshall Plan, or the Marshall Plan of the Middle East, but before people go 
to far there are many reasons why a similar plan will not work in Iraq. 
In order for the ideas of the Marshall Plan to be successful in post war Iraq, a 
myriad of things need to be discussed. First of all the economic, political and social 
conditions in Iraq are extremely different than that of Europe following World War II. 
Much of Europe was in a state of disaster, with factories destroyed and housing damaged, 
but the people were willing to work for their cause, plus people in these countries already 
h�d a stable economic �d political system. 
Politically, Iraq was in shambles following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, 
with multiple political factions fighting for power. On a daily basis there are 
assassinations and bombings between the Shiites and the Sunnis, which make it difficult 
for any one political group to take power. There is no amount of foreign aid and 
assistance that the United States can give· to rid Iraq of these rival factions. As part of our 
first military spending bill for Iraq the U.S. included a $5 billion dollar allotment .towards 
building up Iraqi security forces to help stabilize the nation. Most of the money the U.S. 
spent militarily in Europe during the Marshall Plan years was to keep a large military 
presence for safety reasons and in case there was a need to begin battle with the Soviet 
Union as part of the Cold.War. 1 16 By 1 948 in Western Europe, ''virtually all of the 
western European countries had legitimate, functioning governments in place"1 17; this . 
was something Iraq did not have: 
As for the economic status of the cities of Iraq, one government official stated, "it 
is fair to say that the level of decay and under-investment in the Iraqi infrastructure was 
1 16 IBID. pp.2. 
. 
1 17 Bischof, Gunter & Carafano, Jay. Marshall Plan Won't Work in Iraq. The Her itage Foundat i on. 
www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed 1 02303f.cfm? 
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worse than almost anyone on the outside anticipated" 118 As part of the $87 billion dollar 
war bill in 2003, $ 1 5  billion was to go towards rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, an amount 
that is in addition to the already $2.5 billion that was originally thought to be enough to 
cover most of the costs. 119 Following the five years of fighting during World War II, most 
nations of Europe_ were badly destroyed, but there were a few nations faired much better 
than anticipated. Therefore following the end of World War II, most of the money from 
the Marshall Plan went to fixing preexisting structures and buying raw materials to be 
used in the factories. Many of the economies in Europe just needed the additional money 
to "prime their pump" as Truman stated. Their people knew how to run the machines; 
they just needed to get things going again. This is not the case in Iraq. Since their country 
was held wider the fearful regime of Hussein, many of the factories were not operational 
or working far below potential. Therefore, in Iraq, factories would need to be built and 
updated and people needing training on how to work the machines. All this was going to 
cost money and the bill for Iraq continued to go up. On top of these industrial problems, 
in order to move forward the government of Iraq needs to also establish a strong money 
supply, and more importantly remove harsh trade barriers that make it difficult for 
countries to trade with Iraq. Lastly, work will have to be done to undo what decades of 
totalitarian leadership under Saddam Hussein has done to the country. A new banking 
system and financial market will have to be in place if the government wants to succeed 
in places where failure has occurred before. Furthermore, before any of these economic 
problems change, a sound and secure government needs to take control and provide some 
direction for Iraq. 
1 1 8  Stevenson, Richard W. The Struggle for Iraq: U.S. Budget ; 78% of Bush's Postwar Spending Plan is for 
Military . .  The New York Times. Online Edition. Pp. 2. 
1 19 IBID. pp. I .  
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As for the social conditions in Iraq and Europe, this could be the area where the 
gap is the largest. Nearly one year after the Marshall Plan began in Europe ( 1 948), most 
of the chaos of the aftermath of the war was behind the people and they were ready to 
move forward towards recovery. Marshall declared, "The initiative, I think, must come 
from Europe". 120 With that being said, Marshall thought it would be best if the people, 
who were receiving the money, �hould request the sum they feel would appropriately 
help each nation get back on track. Once the money was given, the people of Europe 
were to take the initiative, like Marshall said, and be in charge of their ow;n destiny. None 
of the post-World War II social conditions that existed in Europe exist in Iraq, making 
this aspect"of the rebuilding difficult. 
Most recently in late 2007, President Bush has asked congress for an additional 
$45.9 billion to cover the 2008 Iraqi war campaign, including rebuilding cities and 
providing military supplies for the U.S troops. Leaders in congress have not determined if 
this amount will be approved towards the war that now is estimated to eventually cost 
U.S. taxpayers over $650 billion dollars by the time we are through in Iraq'. 
Throughout the world since the end of World War II, powerful countries like the 
U.S. and the former Soviet Union have been spreading their ideologies and foreign aid to 
gain support. The concept of foreign aid began with the creation of the Marshall Plan in 
1 947 and although the exact model for the Marshall Plan cannot be used to solve 
economic difficulties in every nation, the idea started here. With our current day situation 
in Iraq, people need to forget about our past success from the Marshall Plan in Europe 
and move forward towards a new plan that will fit Iraq, a nation that lacks political, social 
120 Bischof, Gunter & Carafano, Jay. Marshall Plan Won't Work in Iraq. The Heritage Foundation. 
www .heritage.org/press/commentary/ed 1 02303 f.cfm? 
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and econQmic unity. The foreign policy of the United States has changed numerous times 
over the past decade and will change again in the near future. In our ever changing world 
we need to use the different types of foreign aid and see which best fits each needed 
situation. The .condition of Iraq's economy is a fragile one in which many details need to 
' 
be decided upon with the people of Iraq's best interests in mind. With the United States 
spending billions of dollars per year to improve the Iraq economy, as tax payers we 
should be demanding more results or a change in policy in the years to come. 
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Part III 
Connections to Teaching 
Following the conclusion of World War II the United States emerged as a world 
superpower with very few nations that could challenge them. With this power the United 
States began to assert its influence and help rebuild Europe to the power it was before the 
War began. George C. Marshall unveiled his European Recovery Plan on June 5th, 1 947 
which outlined his vision for economic recovery in Europe. This plan was to bring over 
1 3  billion dollars to European countries in need over the course of four years. The main 
purpose ofthis aid was economic, but with the U.S. money came political influence as 
well. Through the Marshall Plan the U.S. hoped to increase production in European 
nations involved to pre-World War II levels. A major key to this plan was that the United 
States offered this to all nations that were in need with no exceptions. Also, the U.S. 
encouraged each nation to individually determine the necessary amount needed. In the 
end, sixteen nations received money to help rebuild and increase production. By 1 950, 
the Plan was successful and pre-war levels of production were met. The success of the 
Marshall Plan thus led to the United States to expand its policy of foreign aid. 
Starting with the Marshall Plan, the United States began to use its money to assert 
its influence throughout the world. Foreign aid amounts have varied from record post 
World War II levels through current day Iraqi spending .. Throughout the history of the 
United States the programs we support throughout use of foreign aid has shaped our 
nation. This is specifically true following the conclusion of World War II. While 
researching what materials on U.S. foreign aid are available to professionals, the need 
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arose for a document based question (DBQ) for both the Advanced Placement (AP) level 
as well as for the New York State Regents level. In developing the new DBQ's the focus 
was on what the U.S .. has pursued as its foreign policy since the conclusion of World War 
II. While looking at these documents students should be alfle to draw conclusions from 
examples that span the second half of the twentieth century and make connections to how 
U.S� foreign aid has been linked to our foreign policy. When assessments are created the 
use of DBQ's are essential and allow the students to work with multiple perspectives on 
social studies issues. DBQ's allow students to analyze and �valuate primary source 
documents, whiJe forming conclusions based on documents and information from outside 
sources. Lastly, DBQ's encourage students to use the skills of the historian and social 
stjentist by requiring them to read, analyze, apply, synthesize, and evaluate information. 
After discussion with numerous professionals it was determined that the need for 
a Document Based Question that examines United States foreign policy was essential. 
Therefore by using a variety of documents that allow students to interpret not only 
written sources, but also political cartoons, charts and graphs they can formulate 
conclusions and create a well thought out response to the question regarding the changing 
United States foreign policy. 
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AP United States History Free-Response Questions 
United States History 
Section II 
Part A 
(Suggested Writing Time- 45 Minutes) 
Directions: The following question requires you to construct a coherent essay that integrates 
your interpretation of documents A-I and your knowledge of the period referred to in the 
question. High scores will be earned only by essays that both cite key pieces of evidence from 
the documents and draw on outside knowledge of the period. 
1. Discuss the history of lJnited States Foreign Aid following the conclusion of World War 
II (1945). How did the Marshall Plan shape U.S. foreign aid during the second half of 
the twentieth century? What comparisons/conclusions can be made, if any, between the 
U.S. foreign aid following World War II and currently in Iraq? Assess to the extent in 
which our foreign aid �d foreign policy have hdluenced one another during these 65 
years. 
Use the documents and your knowledge of the time period in· constructing your 
resi;-onse. 
Document A 
Source: Speech- George C. Marshall. June 51\ 1947. Marshall Plan 
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requ i rements for the next three or fou r  years 
of foreign food anq other essential products - princi pa l ly from America - are so much 
g reater than her present a b i l ity to ·pay that she m ust have substa ntial  additional help 
or face economic, social,  a nd pol itical deterioration of a very g rave character . . . . .  It is 
logica l  that the U nited States should do whatever it is a ble to do to assist i n  the 
retu rn of normal economic health in the world, without which there ca n be no 
pol itical stab i l ity and no assu red peace. Our pol icy is d i rected not agai nst any cou ntry 
or d octrine but against h u nger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose shou ld 
be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of 
politi cal  a nd social  conditions in which free i nstitutions can exist. 
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Document B 
F i g u re 7. U . S .  Foreign Aid : FY1 946 - FY2005 
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Document C 
Source: John D. Clare. www.johndclare.net 
..,__ ._ _  . ... ......... -.. 
"I ft lP •Htl.. th• ....... -<LC 11," 
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Document D 
S o u rce : "Summary of State Department's Position of European Recovery P lan'', August 26, 
1 947; E R P  
Essential elements of proposals must include . . .  Concrete proposals for area wide 
recovery of agriculture and basic industries--coal, steel, transport, and power - - which 
are fundamental to viable European economy. 
Document E 
Figure 3. Top Foreign Aid 
Recipients, FY1 994 
0 
Soun:es: "SAID n.i:: ·be D�ptar.meut of Stll.te. 
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Figure 4. Top Foreign Aid 
Recipi.ents, FY2004 
I 
II .,. ot :fal 
Document F 
Source: Pekka H irvonen, Stingy Samaritans: Why Recent Increases in Development A id Fail to Help the 
Poor, G lobal Pol icy Forum, August 2005 
Recent increases [in foreign aid] do not tel l the whole truth about rich countries' generosity, or 
the lack of it. Measured as a proportion of gross national income (GN I), aid lags far behind the 
0.7 percent target the United Nations set 35  years ago. Moreover, development assistance is  often 
of dubious qual ity. In many cases, 
• Aid is primari ly designed to serve the strategic and economic interests of the donor 
countries; 
• Or [aid is primarily designed] to benefit powerfu l domestic interest groups; 
• A id systems based on the interests of donors instead of the needs of recipients' make 
development assistance inefficient; 
• Too l ittle aid reaches countries that most desperately need it; and, 
• A l l  too often, aid is wasted on overpriced goods and services from donor countries. 
Document G 
Source: Amy Belasco. The Cost of I raq. Afghanistan, and Other G lobal War on Terror Operations Since 
.2Ll.L_July 1 4th 2008. 
With enactment of the FY2008 Supplemental and FY2009 Bridge Fund on June 30, 
2008, Congress has approved a total of about $859 bi l l ion for m i l itary operations, base security, 
reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans' health care for the three operations 
initiated since the 9/ 1 1 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other 
counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at m i l itary 
bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
Thi s  $859 bi l l ion total covers al l  war-related appropriations from FY200 I through part of 
FY2009 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions. Of that total, CRS 
estimates that I raq wil l  receive about $653 bi l l ion (76%), OEF about $ 1 72 b i l l ion (20%), and 
enhanced base security about $28 bi l l ion (3%), with about $5 bi l l ion that CRS cannot al locate 
( 1 %). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy 
operations, and less than I %  for medical care for veterans. As of Apri l  2008, DO D's month ly 
obligations for contracts and pay averaged about $ 1 2 . 1  b i l l ion, including $9.8 b i l l ion for Iraq, and 
$2.3 b i l l ion for Afghan istan. 
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Document H . 
Source: The Downs and Ups of Foreign Aid, by Frank Trippett. March 261\ 1 979. Time. 
There were many intricate reasons for America's subsequent disenchantment with 
foreign aid, but it became pronounced during the Viet Nam War. It was in 1 968 that 
Congress radical ly slashed the proposed aid budget-by 40%, to a 2 1 -year low of $ 1 .75 
billion. Since then, the program has been in trouble, chronical ly confused, steadily losing 
supporters, widely misunderstood . . . .  Jimmy Carter entered office with the hope of 
doubling U.S .  economic development programs by 1 982, but he soon curbed this 
aspiration in the face of a budget-chopping mood. He has pushed some increases through 
the Congress, with total aid outlays of $5 . 1  bill ion for fiscal 1 978 and $5 .  9 billion for 
fiscal 1 979. His current budget proposes j ust over $6 bill ion for fiscal 1 980, and would 
have been higher. 
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In developing your answers to Part III, be sure to keep these general definitions in 
mind: 
(a) describe means "to illustrate something in words or tell about it" 
(b) explain means "to make plain or understandable; to give reasons for or causes of; to 
show the logical development or relationships of' 
(c) discuss means "to make observations about something using facts, reasoning, and 
argument; to present in some detail" 
Part III 
DOCUMENT-BASED QUESTION 
This question is based on the accompanying documents. The question is 
designed to test your ability to work with historical documents. Some of the 
documents have been edited for the purposes of the question. As you analyze the 
documents, take into account the source of each document and any point of view 
that may be presented in the document. 
Historical Context: 
The United States has been involved in providing foreign aid since the 
conclusion of World War II. By providing aid the United States is able to help 
out nations in need both economically and politically. Since the end of World 
War II the U.S. has provided aid through the Marshall Plan, during Korea 
and Vietnam and most recently during the Post-Iraqi War rebuilding. 
Task: Using information from the documents and your knowledge of United States 
history, answer the questions that follow each document in Part A. Your answers to 
the questions will help you write the Part B essay, in which you will be asked to 
Choose two instances since the conclusion of World War II that the United 
States has used foreign aid either politically or economically. For each: 
• Describe the historical circumstance that led to the need for aid. 
• Explain the details of the aid given 
• Discuss the success or failure of the aid given 
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Part A 
Short-Answer Questions 
l)irections: Analyze the documents and answer the short-answer questions that follow each 
document in the space provided. 
Document 1 
. 
. 
Source: Speech- George C. Marshall. June 5t\ 1947. Marshall Plan 
The truth of the matter is that Europe's req u i rements for the next three or fou r  yea rs 
of foreign food and other essential products - princi pally from America - a re so much 
g reater than her present abi l ity to pay that she. must have su bsta ntial additional help  
or face economic, socia l ,  a nd pol itical deterioration of  a very g rave cha racter . . . . .  It  is 
logical that the U nited States should do whatever it is  a ble to do to assist i n  the 
retu rn of normal economic health in  the world,  without which there ca n be no 
political stabi l ity a nd no assured peace. Our pol icy is d i rected not agai nst any cou ntry 
or doctri ne but agai nst h unger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its pu rpose should 
be the revival of a work i ng economy i n  the world so as to permit the emergence of 
political and social  conditions i n  which free i nstitutions can exist. 
1. According to this document what is the purpose of the Marshall Plan? [1] 
Score 
---
69 
Document 2 
F i g u re 7. U . S .  Foreign Aid : FY1 946 - FY2005 
fiscal yea r 
'ourccs: l ; �AJU, OM B, and "'RS cal u lations 
2. According to the document, which year did the U.S. spend the greatest in 
foreign aid? [ 1 ]  
Score 
---
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Document 3 
3. According to the cartoon, who was the United States helping with the 
Marshall Plan? [1] 
Score 
---
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Document 4 
Source : "Summary of State Department's Position of European Recovery Plan", August 26, 
1 947; ERP 
Essential elements of proposals must include . . .  Concrete proposals for area wide 
recovery of agriculture and basic industries-coal, steel, transport, and power - - which 
are fundamental to viable European economy. 
4. According to the document, what are two specific areas that were focused on 
by the Euroi;>ean Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan)? [2] 
Score 
---
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Document 5 
Fi1gure 3. T op Fore i.gn Aid 
Recip ients FY1 994 
0 :., I ' .� l 
:> l1:r al :loll:.·• 
Sources: USAID at. be D�pmllli!Dt of Srate. 
F i g ure 4. Top Foreign Aid 
Recipi.ents ,. F Y2004 
,, 
5. According to the charts, what two countries received the most aid from the 
U.S. in both 1 994 and 2004? [2] 
Score ----
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Document 6 
Sou rce: Pekka Hirvonen, Stingi1 Samaritans; Why Recent Increases in Development A id Fail to Help the 
Poor, Global Policy Forum, A ugust 2005 
Recent i ncreases [in foreign aid] do not tel l  the whole truth about rich countries' generosity, or 
the lack of it. Measured as a proportion of gross national income (GNI ), aid lags far beh ind the 
0 .7  percent target the United Nations set 35 years ago. Moreover, development assistance is often 
of doubtful quality. In many cases, 
• Aid is primari ly designed to serve the strategic and economic interests of the donor 
countries; 
• Or [aid is primarily designed] to benefit powerful domestic interest groups; 
• Aid systems based on the interests of donors instead of the needs of recipients' make 
development assistance inefficient; 
• Too l ittle aid reaches countries that most desperately need it; and, 
• A l l  too often, aid is wasted on overpriced goods and services from donor countries. 
6. According to the passage, what is one reason discussed for why aid is given? 
[ 1 ]  
Score 
----
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Dotument 7 
Source: Amy Belasco. The Cost oflrag. Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 
9/1 1 .  July 1 4th 2008. 
With enactment of the FY2008 Supplemental and FY2009 Bridge Fund on June 30, 
2008, Congress has approved a total of about $859 billion for military operations, base security, 
reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans' health care for the three operations 
initiated since the 9/1 1  attacks: Operation Enduring Freedqm (OEF) Afghanista.I) and other 
counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military 
bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
This $859 billion total covers all war-related appropriations from F)'.2001 through'part of 
FY2009 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions. Of that total, CRS 
estimates that Iraq will receive alfout $653 billion (76%), OEF about $ 1 72 billion (20%), and 
enhanced base security about $28 billion (3%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate 
( 1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy 
operations, and less than 1 % for medical care for veterans. As of April 2008, DOD' s monthly 
obligations for contracts and pay averaged about '$ 12 . 1  billion, including $9 .8 billion for Iraq, and 
$2.3 billion for Afghanistan. 
7. According to the document, what are two of the· examples given for where the 
approved $859 billion is going to be spent? [2] 
Score 
---
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Document s 
Source: The Downs and Ups of Foreign Aid, by Frank Trippett. March 261\ 1979. Time. 
There were m.any intricate reasons for America's subsequent disenchantment with 
foreign aid, but it became pronounced during the Viet Nam War. It was in 1 968 that 
Congress radically slashed the proposed aid budget-by 40%, to a 2 1 -year low of $ 1 .75 
billion. Since then, the program has been in trouble, chronically confused, steadily losing 
supporters, widely misunderstood . . . . Jimmy Carter entered office with the hope of 
doubling U.S. economic development programs by 1 982, but he soon curbed this 
aspiration in the face of a budget-chopping mood. He has pushed some increases through 
the Congress, with total aid outlays of $5. l  billion for fiscal 1 978 and $5.9 billion for 
fiscal 1979. His current budget proposes just over $6 billion for fiscal 1 980, and would 
have been higher. · 
8. According to the document, what trend occurred regarding foreign aid 
following the Vietnam War? [1] 
Score 
---
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Part B 
Essay 
Directions: 
· 
Write a well-organized essay that includes an introduction, several paragraphs, and a 
conclusion. Use evidence from at least four documents in the body of the essay. 
Support your response with relevant facts, examples, and details. Include additional 
outside information. 
Historical Context: 
The United States has been involved in providing foreign aid since the 
conclusion of World War II. By providing aid the United States is able to help 
out nations in need both economically and politically. Since the end of World 
War II the U.S. has provided aid through the Marshall Pl�n, during Korea 
and Vietnam and most recently during the Post-Iraqi War rebuilding. 
Task: Using information from the documents and your knowledge of United States 
history, answer the questions that follow each document in Part A. Your answers to 
the questions will help you write the Part B essay, in which you will be asked to 
Guidelines: 
Choose two instances since the conclusion of World War II that the United 
States has used foreign aid either politically or economically. For each: 
• Describe the historical circumstance that led to the need for aid. 
• Explain the details of the aid given 
• Discuss the success or failure of the aid given 
In your essay, be sure to 
• Deve.lop all aspects of the task 
• Incorporate information from at least four docwnents 
• Incorporate relevant outside informatio,n 
• Support the theme with relevant facts, examples, and details  
• Use a logical and clear plan of organization, including an introduction and . 
conclusion that are beyond a restatement of the theme 
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